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viewed from the initial time, but these strategies are not time consistent. Consider an asset allo-23 cation problem with a fixed stopping time T . We compute the optimal strategy, as a function of 24 the state variables, at time zero. Now, suppose we re-compute the strategy at some later time t, 25 0 < t < T . For a given state of the system, the strategy we compute at this later time may not agree 26 with the strategy computed at time zero. This has led many investigators to label pre-commitment 27 mean-variance strategies as non-implementable, since the investor has an incentive to deviate from 28 the pre-commitment strategy at t > 0. However, in the mean-variance case, this objection is per-
29
haps not well thought out. For any pre-commitment mean-variance optimal strategy, there exists investment, where the control (in terms of amount in each asset) is shown to be a piecewise linear function of wealth. The lump sum assumption does not hold in general for DC plan investors, who 76 typically make periodic contributions to an investment portfolio.
77
Our main conclusion is that imposing a time consistent constraint on the solution of a mean-
78
CVAR problem appears to result in an investment strategy with undesirable properties. On the 79 other hand, based on the cumulative distribution function of the final wealth, the time consistent 80 linear target shortfall strategy (which coincides with pre-commitment mean-CVAR at time zero) is 81 superior in terms of tail risk reduction compared to the time consistent mean-CVAR policy. 82 
Formulation

83
For simplicity we assume that there are only two assets available in the financial market, namely a 84 risky asset and a risk-free asset. In practice, the risky asset would be a broad market index fund.
85
The investment horizon is T . S t and B t respectively denote the amounts invested in the risky 86 and risk-free assets at time t, t ∈ [0, T ]. In general, these amounts will depend on the investor's 87 strategy over time, as well as changes in the unit prices of the assets. In the absence of an 88 investor determined control (i.e. cash injections or rebalancing), all changes in S t and B t result 89 from changes in asset prices. In this case (absence of control), we assume that S t follows a jump 90 diffusion process. Let t − = t− , → 0 + , i.e. t − is the instant of time before t, and let ξ be a random 91 number representing a jump multiplier. When a jump occurs, S t = ξS t − . Allowing discontinuous 92 jumps lets allows us to explore the effects of severe market crashes on the risky asset holding. We In the absence of control, S t evolves according to
(ξ i − 1)
where µ is the (uncompensated) drift rate, σ is the volatility, dZ is the increment of a Wiener 99 process, π t is a Poisson process with positive intensity parameter λ ξ , and ξ i are i.i.d. positive 100 random variables having distribution (2.1). Moreover, ξ i , π t , and Z are assumed to all be mutually 101 independent.
102
We focus on jump diffusion models for long term equity dynamics since sudden drops in the the purposes of generating an asset allocation strategy for the long term investor.
116
We define the investor's total wealth at time t as
117
Total wealth
We impose the constraints that shorting stock and using leverage (i.e. borrowing) are not permitted,
118
which would be typical of a DC plan retirement savings account.
119
Properties 2.1 (Constant coefficients). In the following, we will assume that the stochastic process 120 parameters r, µ, σ, λ ξ , p up , η 1 , η 2 are constants, independent of (S,B,t). This also implies that κ is 121 a constant as well.
122
Notational Conventions
123
To avoid subscript clutter, in the following, we will occasionally use the notation S t ≡ S(t), B t ≡ 124 B(t) and W t ≡ W (t). Let the inception time of the investment be t 0 = 0. We consider a set T of 125 pre-determined rebalancing times,
For simplicity, we specify T to be equidistant with t i − t i−1 = ∆t = T /M , i = 1, . . . , M . At 128 each rebalancing time t i , i = 0, 1, . . . , M − 1, the investor (i) injects an amount of cash q i into the 129 portfolio, and then (ii) rebalances the portfolio. At t M = T , the portfolio is liquidated. In the 130 following, given a time dependent function f (t), then we will use the shorthand notation
We assume that there are no taxes or other transaction costs, so that the condition
holds. Typically, DC plan savings are held in a tax advantaged account. With infrequent (e.g.
133
yearly) rebalancing, we also expect transaction costs to be small.
134
We denote by X (t) = (S (t) , B (t)), t ∈ [0,T ], the multi-dimensional controlled underlying process, and by x = (s, b) the state of the system. Let the rebalancing control p i (·) be the fraction 136 invested in the risky asset at the rebalancing date t i , i.e.
where T is the set of rebalancing times.
139
More specifically, in our case, we find the optimal strategies amongst all strategies with constant 140 wealth (after injection of cash), so that
(3.5)
Let Z represent the set of admissible values of the control p i (·). An admissible control P ∈ A,
142
where A is the admissible control set, can be written as
We also define P n ≡ P tn ⊂ P as the tail of the set of controls in [t n , t n+1 , . . . , t M −1 ], i.e.
4 Definition of CVAR
145
Let g(W T ) be the probability density function of wealth W T at t = T . Let 
where P * n+1 is optimal for problem TCMC t n+1 (κ) subject to 
The optimal control p n (w) at time t n is then determined from
The solution is advanced (backwards) across time t n by
For t ∈ (t n−1 , t n ), there are no external cash flows, discounting, or controls applied, hence the tower
193
property gives for h < (t n − t n−1 )
Applying Ito's Lemma assuming processes (2.3)-(2.4), and letting h → 0 gives the PIDE for 
then formulation (5.5-5.10) is equivalent to Problem (TCMC tn (κ)). 
Computation of E[W T ]
Given an initial wealth W 0 , and the optimal controls P * , then the above method can be used to
We can determine CVAR α from
which means we need to compute E
separately. This is easily done. Define the function
where at
with p n (w) being the optimal control from equation (5.6). For t ∈ (t n−1 , t n ), U satisfies the PIDE
6 Pre-commitment Mean-CVAR
215
For a given scalarization parameter κ and intervention times t n , the pre-commitment mean-CVAR
Remark 6.1 (Relation to (T CM C(κ))). Note that compared to equations (5.1-5.3) we have dropped 
The optimal control p n (w, W * ) at time t n is then determined from
The solution is advanced (backwards) across time t n by 
231
At t = T , we have
The usual argument gives the PIDE for V (s,b,W * ,t) for t ∈ (t n−1 , t n )
Proposition 6.1 (Equivalence of formulation (6.5-6.10)). Define
then formulation (6.5-6.10) is equivalent to Problem (PCMC tn (κ)).
Proof. Replace V (s,b, W , t − n ) in equation (6.11) by the expressions in equations (6.5-6.10), use 236 equation (6.9), and recursively work backwards in time, then we obtain equations (6.1 -6.2), by 237 interchanging the sup max in the final step.
238
Remark 6.4 (Time inconsistency). Define (TCEQ tn (κα)) :
Proof. This follows since we can regard W * (t 0 ) as a constant in objective function (6.5), and α > 0,
249
which is then equivalent to equation (6.13). With a fixed value of W * (t 0 ), the objective function 250 (6.13) is a simple expectation, hence we can determine P * by dynamic programming, which is 251 clearly time consistent.
252
To be precise, we define an implementable strategy in terms of the controls relevant to this 253 paper:
254
Definition 6.1 (Implementable strategy). A strategy is implementable if there is no incentive to 255 deviate from the strategy computed at the initial time. More precisely, let p t (w, t m ) be the optimal 256 control at time t m , computed at time t , t m ≥ t , t m , t ∈ T . An implementable strategy is such
(6.14)
Corollary 6.1 (Alternative objective function TCEQ: an implementable strategy). The following 259 linear target shortfall strategy (T CEQ), based on pre-commitment mean-CVAR, is implementable
260
• At t = t 0 , solve for the pre-commitment control from equations (6.1-6.2). As a by-product,
261
we obtain W * (t 0 ).
262
• Using this fixed value of W * (t 0 ), we solve problem (6.13) for all t > t 0 . 
with p n (w,W * ) being the optimal control from equation (6.7). For t ∈ (t
7 Scaling Property of the Time Consistent Mean-CVAR control
285
We consider the degenerate case where a lump sum investment is made, and no cash is injected at 286 rebalancing times. In other words, at t = 0, (s,b) = (0,W 0 ), with W 0 being the initial lump sum,
287
and q i = 0, ∀i. For ease of analysis, we will use the formulation of problem T CM C tn (κ) as given 288 in Section 5.1. Before stating our main result, the following Lemmas will be useful.
289
Lemma 7.1 (Properties of solution of equation (5.10)). If Property 2.1 holds, then, given a scalar V (λs, λb, λW * , t
Across rebalancing dates t + n → t − n , we have the following result: V (λs, λb, λW
V (λs, λb, λW
We now have our final result.
307
Theorem 7.1. If a lump sum investment is made (i.e. q n = 0, ∀n), Property 2.1 holds, and the 308 time consistent mean-CVAR strategy is determined by equations (5.5-5.11), then the optimal control 309 for Problem T CM C tn (κ) at each time t n is independent of wealth w, that is 310 p n (w) = p(t n ) ; n = 0, . . . , M − 1, (7.11) which also implies that V (λs, λb, λW * , t) = λV (s,b,W * ,t).
311
Proof. From equation (5.8) we have, for constant λ > 0,
Apply Lemmas 7.2 and 7.1 recursively. Then we have that equation (7.9) holds ∀n. Hence, for any
and V (λs, λb, λW * , t) = λV (s,b,W * ,t).
315
Remark 7.1 (Significance of Theorem 7.1). In our numerical examples, we will consider only the 316 practical case where the initial investment is zero, and the investor adds a fixed amount (real) to the 317 portfolio at each rebalancing date, which is at odds with the assumptions of Theorem 7.1. However,
318
suppose at time t n ∈ T ,
In other words, we examine points in the state space where the future discounted value of the cash 320 injections is small compared to the current wealth. In this case, we can expect that p n (w) is only 321 weakly dependent on wealth.
322
If we are, in fact, interested in a pure lump sum investment, then Theorem 7.1 can be used to 323 reduce the dimensionality of the problem, with resulting computational efficiency. case, from the analysis above, we can see that a simple form for the control is unlikely to exist for 330 the case of periodic contributions to the portfolio, which we verify in our numerical computations. 
Pre-commitment Mean-CVAR
352
For Problem (PCMC tn (κ)), we start with the formulation in Section 6.1. We will use the approach problems, which require optimizing with respect to the rebalancing controls P.
356
For the inner optimization problems (i.e. we regard W * as fixed) we proceed as follows. We 
360
At rebalancing times t n ∈ T , we discretize p ∈ [0,1] using n b equally spaced nodes, and then 361 evaluate the right hand side of equation (6.16) using linear interpolation. We then solve the 362 optimization problem (6.16) using exhaustive search over the discretized p values (recall that W * 363 is fixed in this case).
364
The outer optimization problem in equation (6.4) can be written in terms of V (s,b,W * , t) as
where each evaluation of V (·) requires solution of problem (6.5).
366
We carry out the maximization in equation (8.1) by using a sequence of grids n x × n b to solve 367 problem (6.5). On the coarsest grid, we discretize W * and solve problem (6.5) for each discrete Note that there is no guarantee that we have found the global maximum since the problem is 373 not guaranteed to be convex. 1 However, we have made a few tests by carrying a grid search on the 374 finest grid, which suggests that we do indeed have the globally optimal solution. The data and the method used to fit the parameters for process (2.3) are described in (Dang and index, so all returns are real.
384 Table 9 .1 provides the resulting annualized parameter estimates for the double exponential 
391
As a motivating example, we consider a 35 year old investor saving for retirement in a defined 392 contribution (DC) pension plan. We assume that the investor has a constant (real) salary of 100,000 393 per year, and the total employee-employer contribution to a tax advantaged DC plan account is 394 20% of (real) salary per year. The investor plans to retire at age 65.
395
To be more precise, in our modelling context, we assume that the investor has zero initial wealth,
396
and injects 20,000 per year (real) into the portfolio at times t = 0, 1, . . . , 29 years. The investment 397 horizon is T = 30 years, with annual rebalancing. Further details are given in Table 9 .2. In Table 10 .1 we show the results for the scenario in Table 9 .2, but using a default strategy of 400 rebalancing to a constant weight of p = 0.4 in equities at each rebalancing date.
401
1 In Miller and Yang (2017), the pre-commitment mean-CVAR problem is posed in terms of log WT , which is then shown to result in a convex outer optimization over W * . However, we have posed the problem in terms of WT , which seems more natural, since "you can only spend dollars, not returns". Table 10 .2: Convergence test, pre-commitment mean-CVAR. Parameters in Table 9 .2. The Monte Carlo method used 2.56×10 6 simulations. The numbers in brackets are the standard errors at the 99% confidence level. κ = 0.1, α = .05. Grid refers to the grid used to solve the HJB PDE: n x × n b , where n x is the number of nodes in the log S direction, and n b is the number of nodes in the B direction. Units: thousands of dollars (real).
Expiry time
HJB Equation
Monte
Carlo Table 9 .2. The Monte Carlo method used 2.56 × 10 6 simulations. κ = 2.5, α = .05. Grid refers to the grid used to solve the HJB PDE: n x × n b n w , where n x is the number of nodes in the log S direction, n b is the number of nodes in the B direction, and n w is the number of nodes in the W * direction. The numbers in brackets are the standard errors at the 99% confidence level. Units: thousands of dollars (real). rewrite equations (6.7-6.8) as convergence as the mesh is refined.
424
(a) Percentiles of accumulated wealth.
(b) Percentiles of optimal fraction in equities.
(c) Optimal control heat map. Figure 11 .1: Pre-commitment mean-CVAR, parameters in Table 9 .2. Optimal control computed solving Problem 5.1-5.3. Percentiles of real wealth and the optimal fraction invested in equities.
Optimal control computed by solving problem Statistics based on 2.56 × 10 6 Monte Carlo simulation runs.
Numerical Results
425
In the following, for the time consistent and pre-commitment policies, we compute the controls Table 10 .3 had 10 9 nodes).
436
As a point of comparison, we show the percentiles of accumulated wealth for the constant weight intersect at P rob(W T < W ) = 0.5. The investor has contributed a total of 600,000 (real) over the 442 thirty years. Therefore, any values of W < 600,000 should be regarded as a poor result.
443
The time consistent strategy is dominated by the constant weight strategy for W below the 444 median, which is a poor result given that TCMC is attempting to minimize tail risk. The pre-445 commitment strategy has a sharp decrease in the cumulative distribution function for W < 800, 446 which is reflected in the fact that the CVAR for the pre-commitment strategy is the largest of all 447 three strategies (recall that with definition (4.2) for CVAR, a larger CVAR value has less risk). In 448 terms of reduction of tail risk, as observed at t = 0, the pre-commitment mean-CVAR strategy 449 is clearly superior to the other strategies. Rather surprisingly, the time consistent mean-CVAR 450 strategy appears to be the least effective of all the three strategies (smallest CVAR of all strategies).
451
The pre-commitment strategy dominates the other strategies for wealth levels W < 800,000 and Table 9 .2. Percentiles of real wealth, optimal fraction invested in equities, and control heat map. Optimal control computed by solving Problem 6.1-6.2. Statistics based on 2.56 × 10 6 Monte Carlo simulation runs in the synthetic market.
W > 1,100,000. 
